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TIFFANY V.

SHORT

[22 C.2d

with this general rule. That was an action for an accounting ina JOInt venture. The trial court found that the defendant by the terms of the agreement was to furnish the
capital necessary to make all purchases of stock and materials
and that it was not entitled to a refund of the money. spen~
for tha~ purpose. On appeal the judgment was reversed. ,The
reviewing court concluded from the terms of the agreement
and the statements rendered in the previous four and one-half
years' business that the funds were to be considered as .an
advance, and that therefore the defendant was to receive
credit and be reimbursed for such expenditures. Since the
amount remaining was insuffiCient to reimburse the defendant, '
plaintiff recovered not!J.ing. In the present case there was no
'specific agreement as to division of assets upon dissolution.
Therefore a division and distribution into equal parts before
the return of capital, all of which had peen advanced by one
partner, would 'be improper. None of the manufacturedde~
vices had been distributed by the partnership. There had
been no sales. It is clear from the terms of the agreement that
the .funds furnished' by defendant Short' were in the nature
of advances, since they were to be furnished by him ' I until
such time as the revenues and net income from the above.mentioned enterprises shall suffice to make further investment unnecessary~" On dissolution the profits could be measured only after Short had been reimbursed. There was no
agreement to the contrary and his advancements were therefore a debt of the firm.
The judgment should be and it is hereby modified to provide that, in lieu of the present provision relating to money
judgment and division of proceeds from the sale of assets,
the defendant George A. Short is entitled to the sum of
$553.96 as against the plaintiff Tiffany; that the receiver shall
proceed to sell the assets of the partnership and apply the
proceeds first to the payment of the sum of $1,506.04 to the
defendant Short, and that any remaining proceeds be dis-.
tributed one-third to each of. the parties, the one-third share
of the plaintiff to be applied on the judgment of $553.96 in
favor of the defendant Short until such judgment is satisfied.
As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
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[L. A. No. 18633. In Bank. July 15, 1943.]

WILLIAM J. FRIEDMAN et aI., Respondents, v. THOMAS
M. BERGIN et aI., Appellants.
.
[ll Frauds.-Statuteof-:-Agreements Not·· to B~p,erfonried
WIthin a Year.-A contract for sale of, concessIons at .!". racing track is within the statute of frauds, where such, contract,
• ,:' '
is to be performed over a period of .five years.. , "
[2] Contracts.-Actions.-Findings.-In, anac~ion,for;breaclt. of
contract for sale of, concessions at a racin~ tracki,a findmg
that. the only agreement between,t~epartteswlts.,that,of"a
certain date necessarily implied~hat t!t8 te;rms ~f theaet~~l
'arrangement under 'which the· concessIon was operatec} were,
agreed upon at that time and were intended to/be.a part of-the
.. '.'
. ,
contract then made.
[3] . Frauds,Statllte of-Memorandum:.....R~quisite~St~~men~_of
Material Terms. of Agreement.:.....~racttcal const~ctton c~nnot
supply material terms which should h3.ve been mcluded m an
.
agreement because of the statute of frauds...
[4] Id. ...,..Agreements Not to Be Performed Wit~ina Year"-oral
Modification of Contract.:.....A. parol promIse, Performab,le
over a -_ five-ye!lr period, . ' is within -the. statute of . frauds,
whether or not it is a' modification of another contract.
[5] Id.":"'Agreements Not t9 B,e i»erfQrmed Within "YearLeases.-tike other contracts, a leasehold contract must comply with the statute of fra~ds.

APPEAL from a judgment of· the Super.ior. Court o~Los
Angeles County and from an order m,odlfymg the Judgment; John Beardsley, Judge. Reversed.
Action for breach of contract.
reversed.

Judgment for plaintiffs

Mott & Grant, Kenneth E. Grant and Harry C. Cogen
for Appellants.
Desser & Rau for Respondents.

Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor,
J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

[1] See 12 Cal.Jur. 856, 901; 25 R.C.L. 452.
'._
Mclt. Dig. References: [1]. Frauds-Statute. of, §7, [2] Con
k 28'
tracts, l
!8'
, [3] Frauds , Statute of, § 39;, [4] Frauds. Statute of.
I § 5; [5] Frauds, Statute of, § 1~
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TRAYNOR, J.-In a contract executed April 4, 1937, the
Del Mar Turf Club granted defendant Thomas Bergin the
right to dispense all food, liquors, soft drinks, cigars, cigarettes, and other commodities, and to operate a cafe for employees, at a race track at the San Diego County Fair
Grounds, at Del Mar, California. On April 24, 1937, Bergin
signed an instrument reading as follows: "Received of
William J. Friedman and Alex Charles Goodman, the sum
of two thousand dollars ($2,000) in consideration for the
following concessions at the Del Mar Turf Club: Oigarettes,
cigars, candy, checking, including all lavortories (sic); for
the term of five years commencing with the 1937 season and
ending with the season for the year 1941. This agreement
is to be followed by a formal contract on the same basis as
that between the Del Mar Turf Club and the undersigned
concessionaire." A formal contract was twice tendered plaintiffs Goodman and Friedman, but according to their testimony they rejected it because it contained no clauses covering their understanding that they. were to receive an option
to renew for five years, and that Bergin would return the
$2,000 to plaintiffs if racing were discontinued during the
term of the contract. Although no formal contract was executed, plaintiffs operated the concession at the track for
three years, making a profit of $4,198.61. The greater part of
plaintiffs' sales were made in stands built by Bergin in the
grandstand, and operated by Bergin's employees. Plaintiffs'
sole function in connection with these stands was to provide
the ~oods that were sold there. Bergin accounted to plaintiffs each night for the sales of such goods, and paid the
proceeds to plaintiffs, less 16 2/3% of the candy sales, which
he retained, and 3% of plaintiffs' total sales to cover the
sales tax. Plaintiffs' sales in other parts of the track were
made by girls who circulated through the crowd. Plaintiffs
relied on Bergin to make all necessary arrangements for retail licenses, social security and unemployment insurance
payments, industrial accident insurance, and sales tax.
During part of this period, Bergin acted through the Del
Mar Caterers, to whom he had assigned his general concession from the Del Mar Turf Club. On April 24, 1940, the
Del Mar Caterers assigned this concession to defendants Anderson and Van Steen, informing plaintiffs accordingly. Anderson and Van Steen were unwilling to continue the previ..
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ous arrangement but offered to use their own employeett
and stands for the sale of plaintiffs' goods in return for
50% of plaintiffs' net profits. Plaintiffs acquiesced, and,
through agents, commenced operating the concession. Anderson and Van Steen, however, not only refused to give nightly
accountings but insisted that plaintiffs be responsible for
thelr own licenses, social security and unemployment insurance payments, industrial accident insurance, and sales tax.
After two or three days plaintiffs discontinued operations.
Judgment was given in their favor in an action for breach
of contract and defendants appeal. The defendant Anderson
died during the pendency of the action and his executrix,
Beulah Anderson, was substituted as defendant. After proceedings for new trial, the judgment was modified in certain
particulars not here material. Subsequently, by stipulation
of the parties, an order nunc pro tunc as of the date of
entry of judgment was made striking from the judgment
the name of defendant Del Mar Caterers, who by clerical
error had been included therein.
[1] The contract that plaintiffs seek to enforce was to
be performed over a period of five years and is within the
statute of frauds. (Civ. Code sec. 1624 (1).) Therefore, only
if the instrument executed on April 24 contains the material terms of the contract may plaintiffs recover. (Fritz v.
Mills, 170 Cal. 449 [150 P. 375] ; Zellner v. Wassman, 184
Cal. 80 [193 P. 84] ; see 12 Cal.Jur. 901; Restatement, Contracts, sec. 207; 2 Williston on Contracts, (1936) p. 1618.)
[2] The trial court found that the only agreement between plaintiffs and Bergin was that of April 24, 1937. That
finding necessarily implies that the terms of the actual arrangement under which the concession was operated were
agreed upon at that time and were intended to be a part of
the contract then made. [3] Although plaintiffs and Bergin
may have agreed to tliese terms when they signed the memorandum, they did not include them therein. The memorandum
does not state that plaintiffs were to have the right to sell
their wares. through Bergin's stands and Bergin's employees,
that plaintiffs were to receive. nightly accountings,· or that
Bergin was to pay plaintiffs' licenses, social security and
unemployment insurance payments, industrial accident -insu.rance and sales tax. There is no mention in its two sentences of Bergin's right to retain 16 2/3% of plaintiffs' re~
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ceipts from candy sales. The actual operation of the concession involved the practical construction, not of the terms
of the memorandum, but of material terms not expressed
within it. (See Niles v. Hancock, 140 Cal. 157 [73 P. 8401 ;
Edgar Bros . .co. v. Schmeiser Mfg. 00" 33 Cal.App. 667
[166 P. 366]; Wineburgh v. Gay, 27 Cal.App. 603 [150 P.
1003]; Dillingham v. Dahlgren, 52 Cal.App. 322 [198 p,
832] ; Enlow v. Irwin, 80 Cal.App. 98 [251 P. 658] ; Santoro
v. ltlack, 108 Conn. 683 [145 A. 273]; 2 Williston on Contracts, (1936) p. 1645.)
No contention is made that the reference to the contract
between Bergin and the Del Mar Turf Club was intended
to amplify the memorandum through the incorporation of
that contract. The contract contained a clause requiring
Bergin to erect his own facilities. A like clause in a contract
between Bergin and plaintiffs would have required plaintiffs
to erect the facilities; yet the only breach found by the trial
court was that plaintiffs, were denied the use of stands erected
by Bergin, The Del Mar Turf Club had the right to termina~e Ber~in 's contract. if a named officer of the club regarded
hIS serVIces as unsatISfactory. Bergin was required to post
$5000 as bond for performance, to pay his own sales tax and
to comply with all laws, presumably including Workmen's
Compensation and Social Security Laws, Plaintiffs however
relied upon Bergin to pay such costs as taxes, lic~nses, and
workmen's compensation and social security insurance. They
were never asked to post bond, and there is no indication
that an~ belief that their services were unsatisfactory would
be suffiCIent grounds to permit Bergin to terminate the contract. The reference to the Del Mar contract suggests only
that it was to be a model in form for the formal contract to
be executed, and affords no clue as to how far the parties
proposed to copy the Del Mar contract.
[4] Plaintiffs explain the absence from the memorandum
of the terms of the arrangement under which they operated
on t~e ~ound that those terms were the result, of a parol
modlficat~on of the contract; They testified that in July, at
the opemng of the 1937 racing season, Bergin told them
that they could not erect their own stands, but must work
through his. Plaintiffs testified that Bergin also told them
that he would be responsible for such costs as taxes licenses
and workmen's compensation and social security i~surance'
They therefore 'contend that the- memorandum was a com-
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plete statement of the contract before its modification. Since
the only breach found, however, was the denial of plaintiffs'
right to use the stands erected by Bergin, plaintiffs must rely
upon the modifications in order to recover. These modifications were not made in writing, and a parol promise, performable over a five-year period, is within the statute of
frauds whether or not it is a modification of another contract. (See Twohey v.Realty Syndicate 00.,4 Ca1.2d379 [49
P.2d 819]; Notes, 118 A.L,R. 1511; 29 A.L.R. 1095; 17
A.L.R. 10; 9 Wigmore on Evidence, (1940) p. 177.)
[5] Plaintiffs also contend that a concession contract is
like a lease,and rely on Beckett v. Oity of Paris Dry Goods
00., 14 Ca1.2d 633 [96 P.2d 122], for the proposition that
an insufficient description of the premises 'leased may be
aided by parol evidence. Like other contracts,/ however, a
leasehold contract must comply with the statute of frauds.
(Wineburgh v. Gay, supra; Enlow v. Irwin, supra; Rohan
v. Proctor, 61 Ca1.App. 447 [214 P. 986].) The opinion in ,
the Beckett case does not discuss the statute of fr,auds and
shows that the court had before it a detailed written lease,
involving no omissions comparable to those made in the
Writing on which plaintiff relies.
,The judgment and the order modifying judgment after
proceedings on motion for new trial are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter,
J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

